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Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez in the Evolution
of Federal Law†
Richard B. Collins*
Few Indian law decisions have evoked as much scholarly attention as
Santa Clara Pueblo.1 Shepard's pulls up over 1000 law review references, and
Google reports almost 3,000,000 hits.2 It is a major case in all Indian law
treatises and casebooks and is important in several other books.3 Most analyze
the decision as an event and focus on its principal holding, denying a federal
cause of action for civil enforcement of the Indian Civil Rights Act.4 Policy
discussions parse tribal sovereignty and discrimination against women.5
My focus here is rather to situate the decision in the ongoing
development of the issues it addressed and related matters. Three subjects are
pertinent: evolution of the law on implied federal remedies (Sec. I) , tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians and nonmember Indians (Sec. II), and tribal
sovereign immunity from suit (Sec. III).
†

Eds. note: This paper draws on Professor Richard B. Collins’ remarks delivered at
the 50 Years of the Indian Civil Rights Act, Protection and Denial of The Civil
Rights of Native Americans Symposium, co-sponsored by the Tribal Law Journal
and the Law and Indigenous Peoples Program, UNM School of Law, March 8-9,
2018 at Isleta Pueblo Resort and Casino. Professor Collins provided historical and
background remarks and the Symposium organizers recognized him for his many
years of work in the field of Indian law on March 8, 2018. Collins argued Santa
Clara v. Martinez on behalf of Respondent, Ms. Julia Martinez and her daughter,
Audrey, before the U.S. Supreme Court.
*
Professor, University of Colorado School of Law.
1
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
2
See
https://advance.lexis.com/shepards/shepardspreview/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=fb1f0
6d4-2f59-418a-a381-25ee80d24001&pdshepid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A7XW4F4K1-2NSF-C0P5-0000000&pdshepcat=initial&action=sheppreview&ecomp=Lg85k&prid=77c2d52e-447c4028-962e-cb187aee9b9a (Shepard’s);
https://www.google.com/search?q=Santa+Clara+Pueblo+v+Martinex&ie=utf8&oe=utf-8 (Google) (both last visited Jan. 14, 2018).
3
See NELL JESSUP NEWTON ET AL., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
INDIAN LAW passim (2012); CONFERENCE OF WESTERN STATE ATTORNEYS
GENERAL, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK § 7.6 (2018 ed.); ROBERT ANDERSON
ET AL.,, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 334-51 (3rd ed. 2015); CHARLES WILKINSON ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 434–41 (7th ed. 2017); SARAH
SONG, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF MULTICULTURALISM115-20 (2007).
4
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59-72 (interpreting 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1302
(2012)).
5
See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the
Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 passim (1989); Maria Noel Leoni Zardo,
Gender Equality and Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Self-Determination and Culture,
28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1053, 1073-74, 1085 (2013).
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Basic facts of the case are well known. In 1935, Santa Clara Pueblo
adopted a tribal constitution that accorded membership to "all children of
mixed marriages between members of Santa Clara Pueblo and nonmembers,
provided such children have been recognized and adopted by the council."6
But in 1939 the Santa Clara Pueblo Council passed a law granting automatic
membership to all children of male members in mixed marriages, denying
membership to all children of female members married to outsiders, and
forbidding naturalization of persons not made members by the ordinance.7
The rule was challenged by Julia Martinez, a member whose husband Myles
was Navajo. After their marriage, the couple lived on the Pueblo. Their
children grew up there and participated fully in tribal life, culture, and
language. Julia first challenged the rule soon after birth of her daughter
Audrey in 1946. She and other women made continuous efforts to overturn
the rule that the Martinez trial court summarized.8 An incident that helped
provoke the lawsuit was denial of medical coverage by the Indian Health
Service to the Martinez children for lack of enrollment. The crucial issue in
the lawsuit was whether the Martinez children would have any right to live
on the Pueblo after Julia's death. Health coverage was accorded to the family,
but efforts to compromise on habitation failed.9 Thus, the original case was
filed against HUD, which in turn sued the All-Indian Pueblo Housing
Authority.10 However, short-term housing issues reached an accommodation
by the time of trial. The case proceeded to trial on the question whether the
Pueblo's male membership preference was overridden by the Indian Civil
Rights Act. The Pueblo won the case and maintained the 1939 rule until 2012,
when it was changed based on a referendum vote of Pueblo members.11
I. Federal Remedy and Tribal Membership
A. The Ruling in Santa Clara Pueblo

6

CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE PUEBLO OF SANTA CLARA, NEW MEXICO,
ART. II § 1 (Dec. 20, 1935), available at
https://thorpe.law.ou.edu/IRA/nmsccons.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2018). As the
link states, the constitution was adopted pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 16 (2012). Santa Clara is one of the seven northern New
Mexico pueblo tribes that speak the Tewa language and have occupied the area for
several thousand years. See JOE S. SANDO, PUEBLO NATIONS: EIGHT CENTURIES OF
PUEBLO INDIAN HISTORY (1992).
7
Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 52.
8
Martinez v. Romney, 402 F. Supp. 5, 10-11 (D.N.M. 1975).
9
See id. at 14-15.
10
See id.
11
See Tom Sharpe, Santa Clara Pueblo Vote on Member Rules Leaves Loose Ends,
SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN (May 1, 2012),
(www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/santa-clara-pueblo-vote-onmember-rules-leaves-loose-ends/article_3ea83343-5059-5f87-aa25a473d336aac1.html).
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Julia and Audrey Martinez sued the Pueblo and its Governor in
federal district court in 1973. The suit invoked the Indian Civil Rights Act
(ICRA), passed by Congress in 1968, which provides that "No Indian tribe in
exercising powers of self-government shall . . . deny to any person the equal
protection of its laws . . ."12 At the time suit was filed, ICRA had been
reviewed in numerous lower federal courts but not in the Supreme Court.
Under the precedents, tribal sovereignty was respected in two ways; litigants
had to exhaust tribal remedies before seeking civil remedies under the act, and
federal courts gave some deference to tribal tradition in applying provisions
such as the statute's equal protection clause.13 But jurisdiction of federal
courts to reach the merits after exhaustion was well established.14 In Santa
Clara Pueblo, tribal remedies had been exhausted.15 Tribal membership is a
core sovereign interest, so deference to the Pueblo was a serious issue that
was the focus of the trial. The District Court reached the merits, then held that
tribal sovereignty should sustain the Pueblo's preference for its male
members.16 The Court of Appeals reversed on the latter issue.17 The Supreme
Court granted review and ruled that federal jurisdiction to enforce ICRA is
limited to its explicit provision for habeas corpus, no civil remedy should be
implied, and the case must be dismissed.18 The Court's opinion relied on its
1975 decision in Cort v. Ash,19 which had limited implied federal remedies,
and on federal policy in favor of tribal sovereignty.20
Lower federal courts had sustained authority based in part on the
special federal jurisdiction applicable to civil rights cases. Its relevant text
provides:
The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by
law to be commenced by any person: . . .
(4) To recover damages or to secure
equitable or other relief under any Act of
Congress providing for the protection of
civil rights, including the right to vote.21
A number of courts including the trial court in Santa Clara Pueblo
had interpreted this statute to give the court subject matter jurisdiction and to

12

25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012).
See Martinez v. Romney, 402 F. Supp. at 17.
14
See id. at 10.
15
See id.
16
See id. at 18-19.
17
See Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976), rev’d, 436
U.S. 49 (1978).
18
436 U.S. at 59-72.
19
422 U.S. 66 (1975).
20
See id. at 59-72; infra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
21
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).
13
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authorize remedies.22 Litigants had operated on the same assumption. The
Cort v. Ash decision and its theory did not catch up to the Santa Clara Pueblo
case until it reached the Supreme Court.
As explained below, tribal sovereignty did not fare well in other
contemporary decisions.23 But restricting implied federal remedies or causes
of action has enjoyed robust development in all fields of law. In the meantime,
tribal membership has become a major subject of internal disputes within
tribes, protected from external interference by Santa Clara Pueblo except for
the special case of the Cherokee Freedmen.24
B. Evolution of the Law of Federal Remedies
We can trace evolution of federal law on implied federal remedies
through the medium of the famous Federal Courts treatise by Professors
Henry Hart and Hebert Wechsler and their successors.25 The original edition
published in 1953 discussed implied remedies for enforcement of federal
statutes when the United States is plaintiff but made almost no reference to
implied private remedies.26 The second edition in 1973 added a three-page
note on "Implication of Federal Remedies."27 The leading case at that time
was the unanimous 1964 decision in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, which readily
implied a private cause of action for civil enforcement of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934.28 The edition also recognized civil rights decisions in
which private remedies had been implied.29 The third edition in 1988
22

See Martinez v. Romney, 402 F. Supp. at 7 and cases cited.
See infra part II.
24
See generally DAVID E. WILKINS & SHELLY HULSE WILKINS, DISMEMBERED:
NATIVE DISENROLLMENT AND THE BATTLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2017); Gabriel S.
Galanda & Ryan D. Dreveskracht, Curing the Tribal Disenrollment Epidemic: In
Search of a Remedy, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 383 (2015); Brooke Jarvis, Who Counts as
Native American?, N.Y Times (Jan. 18, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/magazine/who-decides-who-counts-asnative-american.html; Gale Courey Toensing, Washburn on Membership Disputes:
Should US Trample on Sovereignty?, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA (Mar. 4,
2014) (the HTML is inoperable at the time of publication). The Cherokee Freedmen
case involves interpretation of a treaty and federal statute. See Cherokee Nation v.
Nash, 267 F. Supp. 3d 86 (D.D.C. 2017); In re Effect of Cherokee Nation v. Nash,
15 Am. Tribal Law 102 (Cherokee Sup. Ct. 2017). See also Vann v. United States,
701 F.3d 927 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Vann v. Kempthorne, 534 F.3d 741 (D.C. Cir.
2008). However, authority to enforce Indian treaties has been routinely sustained.
25
HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953).
26
Id. at 1114-22. The treatise did cite the few Supreme Court decisions that had
implied private remedies, arising under the Railway Labor Act. See id. at 1227-29.
27
PAUL M. BATOR, PAUL J, MISHKIN, DAVID L. SHAPIRO & HERBERT WECHSLER,
HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 798-800
(2nd ed. 1973).
28
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
29
See BATOR ET AL., supra note 26, at 1419-20.
23
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expanded the note to eight pages to acknowledge significant changes crafted
by Supreme Court decisions in 1974-75 and 1979.30 These decisions severely
restricted the Court's doctrine on implied remedies, a path followed since. As
noted above, the decision crucial to Santa Clara Pueblo was Cort v. Ash. A
unanimous Court proposed a general doctrine for implication of federal
remedies in an opinion by Justice Brennan that was applied in Santa Clara.31
Civil rights laws are, or were, a distinct sub-category of statutes that
raise disputes about rights of enforcement and causes of action. The influence
of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) is noted above. The leading case became Cannon v.
University of Chicago,32 where the Court's four opinions reviewed the issue
in great detail. The issue was whether Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972, which forbids sex discrimination by colleges and universities, could
be enforced by private civil action when the statute lacked an explicit right.33
The majority opinion by Justice Stevens and concurrence by Justice
Rehnquist held that the governing principle was implied intent of Congress,
and, based on the Borak case, Congress had intended that the Court craft
remedies for enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its progeny,
which included Title IX.34 Justice Powell's extended dissent argued that any
implied remedy violated the Separation of Powers doctrine, and Borak should
be overruled.35 The fourth edition of the Hart-Wechsler treaties made Cannon
a principal case,36 and it has remained so in each later version of the treatise.37
Cannon made clear that the justices wanted Congress to take principal
responsibility for determining remedies and causes of action to enforce
federal statutes.38 But it left in place the Cort v. Ash test that allowed implied
remedies if its criteria were satisfied. The issue reached a more conservative
Court in 2001. Alabama administered its driver license test in English only. 39
A lawsuit contended that this violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 but on a

30

PAUL M. BATOR, DANIEL J. MELTZER, PAUL J, MISHKIN, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 943-50
(3d ed. 1988). The decisions, cited at pages 945-47, were Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Securities Investor
Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1974), and National R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
31
436 U.S. at 60-61.
32
441 U.S. 677 (1979).
33
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
34
441 U.S. at 711–12; Id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
35
Id. at 735-36.
36
See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 830 (4th ed. 1996).
37
See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 724 (7th ed. 2015); see id. at 691 (6th ed.
2009).
38
441 U.S. at 717.
39
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 278 (2001).
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disparate impact theory.40 The Court held that no cause of action should be
implied and distinguished Cannon as based on intentional discrimination.41
That strengthened the Cannon dictum that Congress must make most
remedies explicit.
II. Tribal Sovereignty
Retained tribal sovereignty is based on the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of Indian treaties with the United States in the celebrated
Cherokee cases of 1831-32.42 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia was dismissed, but
the Court’s opinion recognized the Cherokee Nation as a state, as a distinct
political society, separated from others, capable of managing its own affairs
and governing itself . . . They have been uniformly treated as a state from
the settlement of our country. The numerous treaties made with them by the
United States recognize them as a people capable of maintaining the relations
of peace and war, of being responsible in their political character for any
violation of their engagements, or for any aggression committed on the
citizens of the United States by any individual of their community. Laws have
been enacted in the spirit of these treaties. The acts of our government plainly
recognize the Cherokee nation as a state, and the courts are bound by those
acts.43 Worcester v. Georgia reaffirmed the Cherokees’ sovereign character
and held that within their territory the Cherokees retained their sovereign
powers limited only by their treaties with the United States and by federal
statutes.44 In one of the few bright spots in 19th Century federal Indian policy,
the theory of Worcester was applied to tribes lacking a treaty and to tribal
territory set aside by statute or executive order.45
The Supreme Court was almost silent on tribal sovereignty from the
demise of the Indian Territory’s tribal courts in 1898 until Worcester was
reaffirmed in Williams v. Lee in 1959.46 Uncertainties in the Williams opinion
40

Id. at 278.
Id. at 282, 291-92.
42
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832): Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1
(1831).
43
30 U.S. at 16.
44
See 31 U.S. at 556-62.
45
This statement cannot be linked to a deliberate decision by Government or Court.
It is apparent from Government actions exercising authority over such tribes and
their reservations from earliest years of the nation. It might derive from wording of
the 1790-1834 Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts, which used comprehensive terms
for Indians, tribes, and Indian country. See NELL JESSUP NEWTON ET. AL., COHEN’S
HANDBOOK, § 1.03 (2012). For one of many modern cases treating an executive
order tribe the same as treaty tribes, see Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S.
130 (1982).
46
358 U.S. 217 (1959). Tribal courts in Indian Territory were abolished by the
Curtis Act of June 28, 1898, ch. 517, §28, 30 Stat. 495, 504-05 (1898). But the
tribes themselves continued to be recognized by the U. S., and their status was
41
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were laid to rest in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission in 1973.47 Tribal
authority over Indians in Indian country was held exclusive of state
jurisdiction unless Congress clearly provided otherwise.48 However, both
opinions cited decisions in which the Court had sustained power of states or
federal territories over non-Indians in Indian country in matters not directly
affecting Indians or tribes.49 These decisions were the background for
challenges to modern assertions of tribal authority over non-Indians and
nonmember Indians in their territory.
Santa Clara Pueblo was preceded in the October 1977 term by two
other important decisions defining tribal sovereignty. First and more dramatic
was Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe.50 The tribe had extended its civil and
criminal jurisdiction over all persons within its territory. Two non-Indians
were convicted of tribal misdemeanors and sought federal court review on
habeas corpus based on the Indian Civil Rights Act.51 The Federal District
Court and Court of Appeals ruled against them,52 but the Supreme Court
reversed.
The main argument to the courts was federal preemption of tribal
authority by the Indian Country Crimes Act.53 The sole precedent on point
had relied on that statute to bar tribal power to punish non-Indians in their
territory.54 That rationale would have answered the Court's main policy
argument that tribal justice systems were vastly different from those that nonIndians would have expected.55 But the Court failed even to mention that
claim and instead invented a sweeping new theory of implied repeal of tribal

expressly preserved by the Five Civilized Tribes Act, ch. 1876, §28, 34 Stat. 137,
148 (1906). In modern times, the tribes have restored tribal courts. See DAVID H.
GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 400–18 (4th ed.
1998) (describing the history of the modern tribal courts). One of the last Supreme
Court decisions before 1898 strongly reaffirmed tribal sovereignty in Indian
country. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
47
411 U.S. 164 (1973). The Court recited and rejected the state’s efforts to
distinguish Williams v. Lee, attempting to restrict it to direct interference with tribal
government. See id. at 166-67, 169-71.
48
Id. at 177.
49
See, e.g., 358 U.S. 217 at 220; 411 U.S. at 168, 171, citing New York ex rel. Ray
v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898); Utah & No.
Railway Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1886).
50
435 U.S. 191.
51
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2012).
52
Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
53
See generally id. at 1010, interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012).
54
Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353, 355 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878) (referring to Rev.
Stat. 2146, superseded by statute, Indian Civil Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152
(2012)). Even this decision should best be characterized as dictum because the court
decided that the alleged offense was committed outside tribal territory. Id. at 354.
55
See Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. at 210-11.
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authority over non-Indians or nonmembers within tribal territory.56 Tribal
sovereignty had been defined in the Court’s Worcester opinion based on
interpretation of the 1785 Treaty of Hopewell with the Cherokee Nation.57
That treaty (and others) expressly agreed to exclude any relationship between
the Cherokees and any foreign nation.58 But nothing in Worcester or any other
decision had interpreted tribal inclusion in the United States to limit internal
tribal sovereignty by implication. Indeed, enactment of the Indian Country
Crimes Act implied the opposite. Because the Court invented the new theory
without any source in legal text, the theory is an open-ended ball of clay to be
molded by its majority of the day.
Two weeks after Oliphant, the Court reported its decision in United
States v. Wheeler.59 In its holding and most aspects of its opinion, the decision
was a win for tribal sovereignty. Mr. Wheeler was a Navajo who was
convicted on a guilty plea of a misdemeanor offense in a Navajo Nation trial
court. He was thereafter indicted for the federal felony of statutory rape. He
moved to dismiss based on the defense of double jeopardy and prevailed in
the Federal District Court and the Ninth Circuit.60 The Supreme Court
unanimously reversed based on the doctrine of separate sovereigns. It is
established law that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar state and federal
prosecutions for the same acts. The Wheeler Court held that tribal and federal
sovereignty were likewise separate.61 But the Court's otherwise robust
reaffirmation of tribal sovereignty inserted the seed of later restrictions on it.
The opinion described tribal sovereignty as applicable to "tribe members"
rather than, as in most prior decisions, including Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe,
to all Indians.62 The Court’s sole prior reference to tribal authority over
“members,” cited in Wheeler, was in a context not directly reviewing tribal
sovereignty.63 That opinion was written by then-Justice Rehnquist, who also
authored the novel opinion in Oliphant. Did he plan the restriction to members
and sell the Court on it?
The Court's next applications of the new theories adopted in Oliphant
and Wheeler occurred in a 1980 decision. Tribes in Washington State had
begun to sell cigarettes free of state tax, attracting lots of non-Indian

56

See id. at 197-211.
Worcester, 31 U.S. 515 at 551-54.
58
Id. at 551-52, 560-61.
59
435 U.S. 313 (1978).
60
Id. at 315-16.
61
Id. at 329-30.
62
See id. at 322-29 (referencing “members” eight times). .
63
The prior use, cited in Wheeler, was a single mention in United States v. Mazurie,
419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975). The change of terms was not at issue in either case, so of
course it was not briefed by the federal government, and no tribe was a party to
either Wheeler or Mazurie. Wheeler, 345 U.S. at 323.
57
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customers.64 The Court had previously held that states could require tribal
members selling cigarettes to collect and remit Montana's cigarette tax
imposed on sales to non-Indians.65 The Washington tribes tried to avoid that
ruling by imposing a tribal tax and designating the tribes as sellers, to create
sovereign interests that were not present in the prior case. The Court rejected
the distinction and upheld the state tax. The opinion did say that the tribal tax
was valid when collected from willing, non-Indian buyers.66 But the decision
also imposed its new members-only theory, holding that the state could tax
Indians belonging to other tribes because their status was equivalent to that of
non-Indians.67
The theory of implied divestiture invented in Oliphant was extended
to civil jurisdiction in Montana v. United States in 1981.68 The Crow
Reservation, set aside by treaty in 1868, is bisected by the Big Horn River, a
navigable stream. A federal dam created a popular fishery within the
Reservation, and in 1974 the Tribe asserted authority to forbid hunting and
fishing within the Reservation by anyone not a tribal member. The United
States filed suit to resolve the ensuing conflict between the State of Montana
and the Tribe. The tribe claimed the right to exclude nonmembers from land
it owned, and the Court agreed.69 But this was a marginal victory because the
Tribe's claim to own the beds and banks of the Big Horn River was rejected
based on a series of decisions that limits tribal ownership of navigable
waterways: only fishing tribes' ownership has been sustained.70 The tribe also
claimed civil authority to regulate all persons on land within the reservation
that it did not own, including Big Horn River land. The Court rejected this
claim, extending its new implied divestiture theory to civil matters. Federal
law precedents, including its own, had sustained tribal civil authority over
non-Indians in Indian country. These were distinguished as power to regulate
"the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the
tribe or its members."71 The Court added that a tribe "may also retain inherent
power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee (nontrust) lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the heath or
welfare of the tribe."72 Both purported exceptions to divestiture showed the
magic of the invented theory: it can be molded and adapted to distinguish
64

Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
141-42, 154 (1980).
65
Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976).
66
447 U.S. at 154.
67
Id. at 161.
68
450 U.S. 544, 564-67 (1981).
69
Id. at 557.
70
Id. at 556. The law on tribal ownership of the beds and banks of navigable
waterways is explained in COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at § 15.05(3).
71
450 U.S. at 565.
72
Id. at 566.
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precedents and let the majority of the day craft a common-law code for Indian
country.
The Montana exception for tribal authority over non-Indians who
enter consensual relationships with tribes enjoyed temporary success in two
decisions that sustained tribal taxes imposed on lessees of tribal oil and gas
resources.73 But the Court later took away the value of those decisions by
allowing states to tax the same interests.74 The latter decision revealed an
emerging conservative majority on the Court that is much more hostile to
tribal sovereignty.75
A year later the Court applied its members-only theory to forbid tribal
prosecution of an Indian who was not a member of the governing tribe.76 The
Court's opinion invoked its implied divestiture theory but this time based on
a manifestly false rendition of history.77 The decision's alternative theory was
that tribal authority could be imposed based only on consent, so that only
members could be governed.78 However, this time Congress reacted by
amending federal law to empower tribes to prosecute nonmember Indians. 79
On review, the Court sustained the amendment's validity, albeit by a split
vote.80 Justice Kennedy, author of the deeply flawed opinion in Duro, thought
more about the issue and wondered whether the status of Indians of any tribe
is a voluntary choice that might justify the amendment.81 Since 1879, whether
status as tribal members is subject to federal authority over Native people is
untested.82 The statute restored criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians,
but its possible effect on civil jurisdiction remains untested.
Many federal decisions since 1990, including several by the Supreme
Court, have reviewed tribal claims to civil authority over non-Indians based
73

See Kerr-McGee v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195 (1985); Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
74
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
75
The three dissenters in the Merrion decision anchored a new majority in Cotton.
The remaining members of the Merrion majority dissented in Cotton. See David H.
Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme
Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1635 (1996) (commenting on Justice
Stevens’ views in the Merrion dissent and Cotton majority).
76
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
77
See Richard B. Collins, Never Construed to Their Prejudice: in Honor of David
Getches, 84 U COLO. L. REV. 1, 53–54 (2013) (claim that jurisdiction had been
historically defined by membership incorrect).
78
See 495 U.S. at 693.
79
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), (4) (2012). The amendment passed about six months after
the Duro decision.
80
See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); Id. at 226 (dissenting opinion of
Souter, J. joined by Scalia, J.).
81
See id. at 214 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
82
See United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695 (C.C.D. Neb.
1879) (No. 14,891) (stating Standing Bear had the right to renounce tribal status).
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on the Montana exception for persons who enter into consensual relations
with tribes. Tribes have lost almost all of them. The Supreme Court has been
particularly hostile. A 5-4 conservative majority denied tribal authority on
strong facts in a 2008 case involving a claim against a non-Indian owned bank
based on the bank's loan to an Indian-owned business.83 In 2014, the Fifth
Circuit sustained jurisdiction of a tribe over a corporation doing business on
the tribe's reservation in a case arising from a contract between the tribe and
the corporation.84 The Supreme Court affirmed by an equally divided vote
that would have gone against the tribe had Justice Scalia remained on the
Court.85
At the time Santa Clara Pueblo was decided, and later, there has been
speculation about the relationship between the denial of federal judicial
remedies to enforce ICRA and the Court's new implicit divestiture theory.86
Oliphant had stressed due process rights.87 A case can be made that the three
1978 decisions were crafted together to isolate tribal sovereignty.
In 2010 and 2013, Congress expanded tribal criminal jurisdiction but
on conditions connected to ICRA. Original ICRA limited tribal punishments
for one offense to six months imprisonment and $500 fine-expanded in 1986
to one year and $5000.88 The Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 amended
ICRA to expand these limits to three years imprisonment and $15,000 but
only on condition that tribes assuming the additional authority provide
defendants "the right to effective assistance of counsel at least equal to that
guaranteed by the United States Constitution," provide indigent defendants
with appointed counsel at tribal expense, require judges in such proceeding to
have "sufficient legal training" and be "licensed to practice law by any

83

Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008).
Dolgen Corp., Inc. v. Mississippi Bank of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167 (5th
Cir. 2014), (aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court in Dollar General Corp. v.
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016)).
85
Bethany R. Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes in the U.S. Supreme Court?:
Menominee, Nebraska v. Parker, Bryant, Dollar General … and Beyond, U. ILL. L.
REV. 1901, 1904 (2017) (“From [Scalia's] remarks at oral argument and his
previous opinions, one can predict that his vote would have led to a ruling against
tribal jurisdiction in Dollar General.”).
86
See, e.g., Ryan Dreveskracht, Tribal Court Jurisdiction and Native Nation
Economies: A Trip Down the Rabbit Hole, 67 NAT'L LAW. GUILD REV. 65, 68-69
(2010); Robert Laurence, A Quincentennial Essay on Martinez v. Santa Clara
Pueblo, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 307, 338-39 (1992) ("Martinez leaves tribal power
unfettered by Anglo-American norms, but Oliphant destroys part of the power itself.
Duro destroys it further. Montana v. United States even further. National Farmers
Union potentially even further."); Amy Conners, Note, The Scalpel and the Ax:
Federal Review of Tribal Decisions in the Interest of Tribal Sovereignty, 44
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 199, 203 (2012).
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435 U.S. at 210-11.
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25 U.S.C. § 1302 (B) (2012).
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jurisdiction in the United States," publish their criminal laws and laws of
evidence and criminal procedure, and make an adequate record of trials.89
The 2013 statute gave tribes jurisdiction over non-Indians with ties to
a tribe who are accused of crimes of domestic violence and dating violence
against Indian victims in Indian country.90 This jurisdiction is conditioned on
the same added protections found in the 2010 act and adds a requirement of
trial by an impartial jury that reflects "a fair cross section of the community"
including non-Indians.91
III. Tribal Sovereign Immunity
The Court's Santa Clara Pueblo opinion held that tribal sovereign
immunity barred federal court jurisdiction over the Pueblo, but federal courts
can hear claims for prospective relief against tribal officials such as the
Pueblo's governor.92 Because the Court ordered the case dismissed, some
commentators have asserted that the latter statement was dictum.93 This seems
incorrect. The first issue in federal district courts is always jurisdiction, and
rulings on it are holdings even if a case is dismissed on other grounds.94 For
example, the trial court in Santa Clara Pueblo sustained its jurisdiction, and
this was a holding despite that court's judgment against plaintiffs.95 The
Supreme Court ruled on immunity before deciding that ICRA has no implied
federal cause of action for civil enforcement. In other decisions, the Court has
made clear that immunity is jurisdictional and thus a prerequisite to reach the
merits of a case including the issue of federal remedy or cause of action.96
Hence Santa Clara Pueblo's immunity rulings were holdings. The
characterization is of little importance, however, because both immunity
rulings are consistent with numerous other decisions and authorities on point.
Examples of these authorities go back at least as far as Alexander
Hamilton's essay No. 81 in the Federalist which declared, “It is inherent in the
nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual with-out its
consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind; and
the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the
government of every State in the Union.” 97 The issue was less certain than
89

25 U.S.C. § 1302 (a)(7)(C), (c).
25 U.S.C. § 1304 (2012).
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Id. at § 1304 (c)-(d) (2012).
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436 U.S. at 59.
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See, e.g., Catherine Baker Stetson & Jennifer L. Chino, Waiving Sovereign
Immunity Grows Trickier, 43 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MIN. L. FOUND. J. 53, 58 (2006).
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See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 93–94 (1998)
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See Martinez v. Romney, 402 F. Supp. at 11, 18-19.
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Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); Puyallup Tribe,
Inc. v. Washington Dep’t of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 172 (1977).
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 548-49 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
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Hamilton claimed. Most states had not yet addressed the issue, and his essay
preceded ratification of the federal Constitution. 98 However, in the decades
after ratification, federal courts and those of every state accepted sovereign
immunity as domestic law. 99 The special case of state immunity to suit in
federal courts generated the 11th Amendment. Its specific terms bar only
diversity cases, but the Supreme Court held that it is representative of a
general principle of state immunity that is implicit in the original
Constitution.100
In the first reported decision involving immunity of an Indian tribe,
plaintiff tried to avoid immunity by suing the tribal chief, but the Supreme
Court held that the tribe was the real party in interest and could not be sued
without its consent. 101 Other federal decisions through the 19th and first half
of the 20th centuries consistently sustained immunity of tribes and of tribal
officers sued for damages. 102 Dicta in some opinions said that Congress
could override tribal immunity, and Congress concurred by enacting waivers
of immunity for specific suits against tribes. 103 When the Court finally
reviewed a suit against tribes by name, it held tribal immunity to be
jurisdictional, as is that of the federal government. 104
Litigants also sought to avoid federal and state immunity by suing
officials instead of a government. After back and forth through the 19 th
Century, the Court settled on the principle that suing an officer for damages
or other retroactive relief that would run against the government is barred

98

See Maeva Marcus & Natalie Wexler, Suits Against States: Diversity of Opinion
in the 1790s, 1993 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 73; During the Confederation period, only one
reported case ruled on immunity, Nathan v. Virginia, 1 Dall. 77 (Pa. Ct. Common
Pleas 1784). The court sustained Virginia's immunity to suit in a Pennsylvanian
court. See CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY 13 (1972).
99
See CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE GOVERNMENTS § 2.2 (Wesley H. Winborne,
ed. 1982); Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 1, 6
(1924); Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1858).
100
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Adams v. Murphy, 165 F. 304 (8th Cir. 1908); Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of
Indians, 66 F. 372, 375 (8th Cir. 1895); Chadick v. Duncan, No. 15,317 (App. D.C.
Mar. 3, 1894) (available at Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. Record Group No.
376, Case File No. 314). See Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919) (dictum).
103
See, e.g., Thebo, 66 F. at 373. For statutes authorizing suits against tribes, see
Appropriations Act of May 25, 1918, ch. 86, § 18, 40 Stat. 561, 583 (1918);
Appropriations Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 216, 35 Stat. 444 (1908) §§ 2, 5, 16, 26,
27; Appropriations Act of June 20, 1906, ch. 3449, 34 Stat. 325, 344, 345, 365-66.
For reported cases based on these statutes, see Garland’s Heirs v. Choctaw Nation,
272 U.S. 728 (1927); Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919); Green v.
Menominee Tribe, 233 U.S. 558 (1914); McMurray v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 62
Ct. Cl. 458 (1926), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 524 (1927).
104
United States v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514-15 (1940).
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by immunity. 105 But suing an officer for prospective enforcement of
constitutional or other paramount rights is allowed. The leading case of Ex
parte Young 106 involved a federal case against a state official, but the same
principle applies to federal suits against federal officers.107
Supreme Court review of tribal immunity resumed in the 1977
Puyallup case, in which Washington state courts had asserted jurisdiction
over a fishing tribe and its fishermen. 108 The Court ordered the tribe
dismissed as immune but sustained jurisdiction to grant prospective relief
against the fishermen. 109 Santa Clara Pueblo followed a year later, holding
that immunity barred suit against the tribe but allowing prospective relief
against the tribe's governor. 110
Since Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court has sustained tribal immunity
in four holdings and in dicta in two cases.111 In the same period, it has
allowed suits against tribal officials for prospective relief in four decisions
and in two cases by dicta.112 Most controversial are decisions sustaining
immunity of tribes for activities outside Indian country, limiting jurisdiction
to actions against officers for prospective relief. 113 Subject to dissents, the
Court has consistently held that any change is a matter for Congress. 114
Meanwhile, many tribes have adopted modern forms of consent to suit in
their own courts and at times in state or federal courts. 115 However, active
litigation on tribal immunity continues. 116
Conclusion
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As this paper's review shows, Santa Clara Pueblo was much more
than a one-time legal event. It was decided at a time of, and was connected
to, major changes in federal Indian law and in implied federal causes of
action. Tribal sovereignty was strengthened in Santa Clara Pueblo and in
Wheeler.117 But the Court's simultaneous invention of its implied divestiture
theory severely limited tribal authority. 118
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118

See supra notes 16-20, 58-60 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 49-86 and accompanying text.

